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RENEWED DEBATE OVER ALASKA’S
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: HUNT V.
KENAI PENINSULA BOROUGH AND
THE CHURCH OF THE FLYING
SPAGHETTI MONSTER
Mary Beth Barksdale*
ABSTRACT
In 2019, a pastor of the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster, a
“Pastafarian,” raised concerns about the entanglement of Alaskan local
government and religion. His commentary highlighted the need to take a fresh
look at Alaska’s establishment clause jurisprudence. While Hunt v. Kenai
Peninsula Borough addressed legislative prayer, further questions remain
open about the limits of public spending on religious institutions, the need to
honor Alaska’s religious diversity, and the role of religion in everyday Alaskan
government. While the Alaska jurisprudence has not changed much since the
1980s, the Pastafarians have demonstrated that establishment clause debates
are alive and well. Therefore, Alaska may look to early constitutional debates
in other states, like Massachusetts and Virginia, to evaluate its policy choices,
balancing the esteemed place of religion in Alaskan society and the deep-seated
belief in separation of church and state.

I. INTRODUCTION
The freedom of religion, in all its complexities, is unquestionably a
central tenet of American conceptions of liberty and government.
However, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution is far
from the final word on what it means to guarantee religious freedom.
Rather, states have unique historical and theoretical relationships with
religious traditions. Those foundational relationships inform each state’s
approach to the overlap of religion and government. In Alaska, the state
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constitution provides more stringent prohibitions on the overlap of
church and state than the U.S. Constitution.1 While the text of article 1,
section 4 of the Alaska Constitution nearly mirrors its federal counterpart,
the Alaska courts have often interpreted the clause to protect more
religious freedoms and restrict more government support of religious
institutions.2
When the founding pastor of the First Lower Peninsula
Congregation of Pastafarians gave the invocation at a Kenai Peninsula
Borough Council meeting in 2019, establishment clause debates dating
back to the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 reared their heads once
again, this time in Alaska.3 This Comment will discuss the development
of Alaska’s establishment clause jurisprudence, tracing arguments from
the United States’ early constitutional history to modern-day Alaska and
the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster. The Pastafarians make one
thing clear: the threat of religious influence in the halls of government will
be taken seriously in Alaska, and even minor infractions will continue to
be cause for debate, demonstration, and disappointment. In choosing
their establishment policies, Alaskan local governments should therefore
take note of these sarcastic dissenters’ points and look to the examples of
early constitutional debate to develop tailored solutions for the Last
Frontier.
Alaska’s state and local establishment policies moving forward will
largely fall into two buckets. The first includes those policies emphasizing
the cultural value of religious diversity and carving out a place for
religion alongside government. The second contains policies emphasizing
the potential for undue influence (either of religion on government or vice
versa) and adhering to a strict separation of government and religious
functions. These policy choices are far from novel—other states have long
histories concerning the intermingling of religion and government.4
Massachusetts and Virginia, for example, both engaged in vigorous
establishment clause debates in the first few decades after the American

1. See, e.g., Sheldon Jackson College v. State, 599 P.2d 127, 129 (Alaska 1979)
(creating a new test for unique establishment-related provisions of the Alaska
Constitution).
2. Compare id. (establishing a four-part test for aid to private institutions in
Alaska), with Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 835–36 (2000) (holding that direct
aid to religious schools for secular good was constitutional).
3. Hannah Natanson, A Pastafarian Opened a Council Meeting Wearing a
Spaghetti Strainer. He Says It’s About Separation of Church and State, WASH. POST
(Sept. 19, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/09/20/pastafarian-openedcouncil-meeting-wearing-spaghetti-strainer-he-says-its-about-separationchurch-state/.
4. See infra Part IV.
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Revolution, and their case law traces the states’ different cultural views of
religion.5
For Alaska, the choice may be even more poignant than in other
states. On the one hand, the Last Frontier boasts incredible religious
diversity, contributing to cultural roots across the state.6 On the other, the
recent debate raised by Barrett Fletcher, the founding pastor of the First
Lower Peninsula Congregation of Pastafarians, highlights the state’s
fiercely independent ethos, unfriendly to the suggestion that any
favoritism would be permissible.7
This Comment argues that the Pastafarians are right to highlight the
potential dangers of minor intrusions of religion on government and
attempts to predict the direction Alaska will take. First, Part II details
recent events that shed new light on the role of religion in local and state
government in Alaska. Next, Part III reviews the (somewhat scarce)
jurisprudence on the state establishment clause leading up to the current
debate. Then, Part IV contextualizes the Alaskan law in light of the early
constitutional debates. Lastly, Part V argues that, at least in the state of
Alaska, the Pastafarians have the upper hand in the long-standing
establishment debate.

II. SETTING THE SCENE: THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ALASKA
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The Alaska Constitution reads, “[n]o law shall be made respecting
the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”8
But much like the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the metes
and bounds of “establishment” remain an open debate in Alaskan courts,
town meetings, and popular discourse.9 Just in the last five years,

5. Id.
6. For example, Anchorage boasts a wide variety of Christian
denominations, including those that have incorporated Alaska Native religions;
Jewish congregations; Islamic citizens; a Hindu temple; a hospital that
incorporates Alaska Native healing practices; the Ba’hai National Office; and
intermittent Buddhist and Sikh communities. See Regina A. Boisclair, The Spiritual
Profile of Greater Anchorage, ALASKA PAC. UNIV., Nov. 2008, at 1, 2; see also,
Angayuqap Oscar Kawagley, An Alaska Native’s Theory on Events Leading to
Spiritual
Loss
of
Life,
ALASKA
NATIVE
KNOWLEDGE
NETWORK,
http://ankn.uaf.edu/Curriculum/Articles/OscarKawagley/AKNativeTheory.h
tml (last visited Mar. 29, 2022) (discussing the impact of outside influences on
Native religions in Alaska).
7. See Natanson, supra note 3 (detailing the debate over the Kenai Peninsula
Borough Assembly’s use of religious invocations to begin meetings).
8. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 4.
9. See Natanson, supra note 3 (detailing the debate over the Kenai Peninsula
Borough Assembly’s use of religious invocations to begin meetings).
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concerned citizens and local governments have asked the state courts to
weigh in on what “counts” as the establishment of religion:10 is it the
preference for one religion, or set of religions, over another? Or is it the
intertwining of government and religion in any degree?11 Moreover, is
there reason to think that one reading of the state establishment clause
lends itself to better policy-making than the other? If a certain reading leads
to better policy, what priorities should govern the policy choices between
protecting religion and preventing favoritism?
Among the considerations Alaskans face are the importance of
religion to the state’s cultural diversity and the threat of undue influence
on the government if religion takes an elevated position.12 These
potentially warring priorities underlie the factual and legal scenes, giving
rise to the live debate sparked by the Pastafarians and calling on Alaska
to revisit establishment clause jurisprudence that has remained largely
unchanged since the 1980s.
In Hunt v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, the Superior Court13 at Anchorage
relied on U.S. Supreme Court precedents14 to find that demonstrating
preference for one religion over another violates the establishment
clause.15 There, the court reviewed a challenge to the Kenai Peninsula
Borough Assembly’s invocation policy adopted in reaction to
controversial invocations at town council meetings, including one that
ended with the words “Hail Satan.”16 The policy required that the
invocation speaker be an “authorized leader” of a religious association
“with an established presence in the Kenai Peninsula Borough” or a
10. See id. (discussing the litigation arising over policies constraining
religious invocations).
11. Hunt v. Kenai Borough Peninsula, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI, at 3 (Alaska
Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 2018) (on file with Alaska ACLU),
https://www.acluak.org/sites/default/files/3an-16-10652ci.pdf.
12. See Natanson, supra note 3 (detailing the Pastafarian position that
religious practices like legislative prayer could threaten diversity of ideas. The
Pastafarians argue that the invocation of religion at the opening of a government
meetings creates this threat by showing favoritism to a certain religion and
alienating non-religious individuals.).
13. The Alaska Superior Courts are trial courts of general jurisdiction. Court
System Information, ALASKA CT. SYS.,
http://www.courts.alaska.gov/main/ctinfo.htm#superior (last visited Apr. 16,
2022).
14. Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI, at 9–14 (first citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463
US 783 (1983); and then Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014)). While
these precedents focus narrowly on the question of legislative prayer, Alaskan
precedents construing the state establishment clause in other contexts are also
worth considering. See Steven Keith Green, Note, Freedom of Religion in Alaska:
Interpreting the Alaska Constitution, 5 ALASKA L. REV. 237 (1988) (reviewing religious
freedom caselaw in Alaska).
15. See Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI, at 2.
16. Id. at 3.
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chaplain serving at one of the “fire departments, law enforcement
agencies, hospitals, or other similar organizations in the borough.”17 The
policy denied individuals not qualifying under those standards the
opportunity to give the town meeting invocation.18 The court found that,
despite the history of legislative prayer in Alaska and across the United
States, the invocation policy violated the establishment clause by
excluding minority faiths from the invocation practice.19 The court took a
firm stance, stating that the establishment clause “not only prohibit[s] the
establishment of a state religion, it prohibits laws that act as a step
towards the establishment of a state religion.”20
However, the court’s decision failed to fully answer whether the
establishment clause requires that non-religious individuals be given equal
opportunity to offer the invocation.21 Unfortunately for non-believers, the
court only specified that the invocation tradition was intended to promote
unity, so that “people of many faiths [or beliefs] may be united in a
community of tolerance and devotion.”22 For some, that line simply was
not strong enough.
In September 2019, Barrett Fletcher raised the establishment issue
once again in Kenai Peninsula Borough.23 Fletcher, wearing a colander as
a hat, opened the town meeting by invoking “the true inebriated creator
of the universe, . . . the Great Flying Spaghetti Monster.”24 Meeting
attendees chuckled; one turned his back.25 In his invocation, Fletcher
noted that “a few of the Assembly members seem to feel that they can’t
do [the Assembly’s work] without being overseen by a higher
authority.”26 He offered the Flying Spaghetti Monster, the Pastafarian
god, as that authority.27 Fletcher ended his invocation with a resounding,
“Ramen,” and returned to his seat, colander still in place atop his head.28
While Fletcher claimed to be “there to defend the First Amendment,”

17. Id. at 4.
18. Id. at 16.
19. Id. at 16–17.
20. Id. at 7.
21. Charles Truslow & Craig Jones, Comment, Hunt v. Kenai Peninsula
Borough: The Search for Clarity in Legislative Prayer Speaker Selection, 36 ALASKA L.
REV. 119, 129 (2019).
22. Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI at 17.
23. See Natanson, supra note 3 (“Fletcher’s delivery of the Pastafarian
invocation Tuesday marked the culmination of a years-long legal battle over the
Kenai Peninsula Borough Assembly’s habit of holding religious invocations
before its meetings.”).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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his prayer raises perhaps more interesting questions about the state
establishment clause and the role of religion in state and local
government.29 According to Zeba Huq, a Stanford Law School lecturer,
the Alaska Superior Court’s decision in Hunt reflects a position that
allows some “mix[ing] of religion with government––as long as all
religions are treated equally.”30 But Pastafarianism’s founding explicitly
rejects the mixing of religion and government, as the Church was created
to mock organized belief and highlight establishment problems.31
Fletcher himself founded the First Lower Peninsula Congregation of
Pastafarians in response to the Borough’s invocation policy.32 Rather than
supporting the Superior Court’s vision of a tolerant community,
Fletcher’s church would eliminate the invocation practice altogether.33
His stance thus begs the question for the small Alaskan town, and for the
state as a whole: what should the establishment clause require?
In short, despite the Superior Court’s 2018 holding, the
establishment debate remains alive and well in Alaska.34 The Pastafarians
represent one side of the debate, aligning themselves with the view that
“no law . . . respecting the establishment of religion” really means no
law.35 The Pastafarians, in other words, argue for strict separation,
preventing the government from considering religion and religion from
influencing the government. The underlying concern for the Pastafarians
is that government support of religious institutions alienates nonreligious individuals and demonstrates a preference for established or
recognized religions.36 On the other side, concerns for Alaska’s religious
and cultural diversity call for the state to support religion generally,
giving it legitimacy through practices like legislative prayer.37 More than
seventeen defined faiths are represented in Alaska, including those
unique to Alaska Natives, and those faiths contribute to the sociocultural
landscape that makes Alaska unique.38 At least for now, however, there
29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting Zeba Huq on the meaning of Hunt v. Kenai Borough Peninsula,
No. 3AN-16-10652 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 2018) (on file with Alaska ACLU),
https://www.acluak.org/sites/default/files/3an-16-10652ci.pdf.).
31. Pat Bauer, Flying Spaghetti Monster: Deity of Pastafarian Social Movement,
BRITANNICA (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.britannica.com/topic/FlyingSpaghetti-Monster.
32. Natanson, supra note 3.
33. See id. (explaining Fletcher’s offense at “having God associated with [his]
local politics”).
34. Truslow & Jones, supra note 21.
35. Bauer, supra note 31.
36. See id.
37. Natanson, supra note 3.
38. See, e.g., Kawagley, supra note 6 (discussing the impact of outside
influences on Native religions in Alaska).
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appears to be little consensus on the best course of action for the state.

III. INTERPRETATIVE HISTORY OF ALASKA’S ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
The Alaska Constitution contains three relevant sections that define,
limit, and contextualize the establishment of religion in the state. First, the
establishment clause itself appears in article I, section 4, reading, “[n]o
law shall be made respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.”39 Next, article VII, section 1 imposes further
limits on the role of religion in municipal capacities, stating that,
“[s]chools and institutions so established [by general law] shall be free
from sectarian control. No money shall be paid from public funds for the
direct benefit of any religious or other private educational institution.”40
Lastly, article IX, section 6 reads, “[n]o tax shall be levied, or
appropriation of money made, or public property transferred, nor shall
the public credit be used, except for a public purpose.”41 On their face,
these provisions seem to eliminate any room for the mixing of religion
and government. However, the tradition of legislative prayer, the
potentially broad meaning of public purpose, and the diversity of
religious background in Alaska42 all suggest that religion may still have
an important place in the functions of Alaskan government.
Three sources give particularly good insight into the state of the
Alaskan establishment clause jurisprudence before the Hunt decision.
First, Steven Keith Green’s note, Freedom of Religion in Alaska: Interpreting
the Alaska Constitution, provides an overview of Alaska’s religion clauses
generally, summarizing holdings and implications that remain
substantively similar today:43 outside of the realm of legislative prayer
addressed in Hunt, there has been little to no movement in the courts on
Alaska’s establishment clause despite the changing religious landscape.44
Second and third, Boujour v. Boujour45 and Sheldon Jackson College v. State46
form the basis of Alaska’s establishment clause caselaw, laying the
foundation for today’s debates.

39. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 4.
40. Id. art. VII, § 1.
41. Id. art. IX, § 6.
42. Adults in Alaska: Religious Composition of Adults in Alaska, PEW RSCH. CTR.,
https://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/alaska/ (last
visited Mar. 29, 2022).
43. Green, supra note 14.
44. Natanson, supra note 3.
45. 592 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1979).
46. 599 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1979).
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A. Green’s Freedom of Religion in Alaska: Interpreting the Alaska
Constitution
Steven Keith Green’s 1988 note provides a helpful overview of the
Alaskan religion clauses.47 He argues that, “[g]enerally speaking, the
Alaska Constitution provides a high degree of protection for the practice
of religious beliefs.”48 In introducing the establishment clause cases
specifically, Green notes that the three constitutional provisions listed
above combine to create a presumption that no public funds can be used
for any religious purpose.49 However, the text of those clauses fail to
present a clear picture of what “public purpose,” “direct benefit,” and
even “establishment” entail.50 As test cases arose quickly to challenge
everything from hospital funding to personal religious preference,
Alaska’s early caselaw began to clarify these points.51
Green first details the most important state court decisions
addressing freedom of religion.52 Those cases range in subject from school
buses for non-public schools, to leases for parochially-funded hospital
buildings, to tuition assistance programs for higher education, to custody
disputes considering the child’s religious needs.53 Green helpfully pulls
rules from each case. From one, he reports that the Alaska court rejected
the federal caselaw on provision of secular goods to religious schools,
holding instead that such general assistance “did in fact ‘aid, encourage,
sustain and support’ . . . parochial education.”54 From another, he notes
that the court reversed course, finding that a lease of a governmentowned hospital to a Catholic charity satisfied the public purpose clause’s
requirements.55 Green then traces the development of the jurisprudence
through Sheldon Jackson College v. State56 and Bonjour v. Bonjour,57 two
influential decisions that will be discussed in detail below.58
After reviewing the cases, Green concludes that “it is clear that the
court considers the establishment clause to prohibit more than the
establishment of a state religion or discrimination among religious
47. Green, supra note 14.
48. Id. at 238.
49. Id. at 239–41, 249–50.
50. See id. at 250 (discussing the Alaska Supreme Court’s difficulty
interpreting “public purpose” and “direct benefit”).
51. See id. at 250–51 (reviewing early Alaska establishment clause caselaw).
52. See id.
53. See id. (detailing the Alaska Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the “public
purpose” and “direct benefit” clauses).
54. Id. at 250 (quoting Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932, 941 (Alaska 1961)).
55. Id. (discussing Lien v. City of Ketchikan, 383 P.2d 721 (Alaska 1963)).
56. 599 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1979).
57. 592 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1979).
58. See infra Section III.B.
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sects.”59 Rather, “the establishment clause stands independently as a
barrier to government action which favors religion over non-religion.”60
Green finds the court’s statement conclusive, leaving no room for
“supporting or endorsing” religion generally or in government.61 He
professes that Alaska’s jurisprudence “is what Thomas Jefferson
intended,” letting religion grow or recede on its own, neither influencing
the government, nor being influenced by the government.62 In other
words, Green would likely agree with the Pastafarians that Alaska should
hold tightly to its strong establishment clause jurisprudence, limiting
practices like the public funding of religious institutions and legislative
prayer.
However, Green’s review provides no concrete boundaries for the
Alaskan establishment clause, and his conclusion does not address the
remaining questions in interpreting the freedom of religion in Alaska:
What is the relationship between the federal and state establishment
clause doctrines?63 Where exactly is the line between public purpose
funding and prohibited support for religion?64 Moreover, and most
importantly for today’s debate, none of these cases address religious
influences in state and local government, focusing instead on support and
endorsement from government to religion. Should the establishment
clause be read to prohibit any interweaving of religion and government,
no matter which direction the influence flows?65 Specifically, what limits
are there on local legislative prayer practices, and what do those limits
mean for religious institutions to participate in government? So far, the
Alaska Supreme Court has not answered these questions. While Green is
probably right to conclude that the “separation of church and state [is]
alive and well in Alaska,” thirty years later, these unanswered questions
deserve revisiting.66
B. Caselaw: Bonjour, Sheldon Jackson College, and Other Cases
Two cases from 1979 play pivotal roles in expounding the “No law”
59. Green, supra note 14, at 259.
60. Id. at 260 (quoting Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1241 (Alaska 1979)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 260–61.
63. See generally id. (analyzing state caselaw alongside federal developments
in establishment clause jurisprudence).
64. Compare Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961) (holding that a
statute permitting incidental benefits to nonpublic school students violates the
public purpose provision), with Lien v. City of Ketchikan, 383 P.2d 721 (Alaska
1963) (holding that leasing a hospital built with federal, state, and local funds to a
religious corporation did not violate the public purpose provision).
65. See Green, supra note 14, at 249–61.
66. See id. at 261.
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provision of article I, section 4 and therefore merit further exploration.
First, in Bonjour v. Bonjour,67 the Alaska Supreme Court evaluated the
role of religion in child custody cases, holding that a court could consider
only the expressed religious needs of a child in adjudicating a custody
dispute.68 There, the appellant alleged that the trial court’s decision to
award her ex-husband custody of their son, in part based on the child’s
religious needs, violated the free exercise and establishment clauses of the
Alaska Constitution.69 The trial court had relied on a state statute which
included “the physical, emotional, mental, religious and social needs of
the child” as factors for determining the best interests of a child.70 In doing
so, the trial court explicitly considered the boy’s religious needs, citing the
father’s participation in “an organized religious community” as a
positive, and the mother’s mere “passive interest” in her son’s religious
development as a neutral.71
The Supreme Court of Alaska undertook a careful analysis of the
line-drawing problem that the custody statute presented.72 On one hand,
the court noted that “to hold that a court may not consider religious
factors under any circumstances would blind courts to important
elements bearing on the best interests of the child.”73 To avoid that
blindness, the court declared that “it [is] constitutionally permissible for
a court to take account of the actual religious needs of a child in awarding
custody to one parent or another.”74 On the other hand, the court
simultaneously worried that inserting judicial assessment into the value
of religion to a particular child approached state preference for religion
more generally.75 The court therefore carefully limited its ruling, stating
that judicial consideration of a child’s religious needs must be “properly
limited to an examination of a child’s actual religious needs.”76 Actual
religious needs, according to the court, must be expressed preferences of
“the mature child,” rather than presumed religious values upheld by
judges.77 The supreme court thus concluded that the trial court
improperly focused on the religious affiliation of the parents without a
finding of the child’s “actual religious needs.”78 Bonjour therefore
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

592 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1979).
Id. at 1244.
Id. at 1235.
Id. at 1236 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.205 (2021)).
Id. at 1237.
See id. at 1238–40.
Id. at 1238.
Id. at 1239.
Id. at 1242–43.
Id. at 1242 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1243.
Id. at 1244.
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restricted Alaska courts’ judgment because of a concern for the mere
appearance of establishing religious preferences.79
The court’s analysis in Bonjour reveals the potential complexities of
a state establishment clause, even one as facially restrictive as Alaska’s.
Most importantly, despite relying on a free-exercise-like justification for
allowing a child to express their religious preferences and needs to the
court, and for allowing the court to take those statements into
consideration, the extensive discussion demonstrates the court’s
recognition that religion can serve a type of public good—here, through
the courts’ consideration of individual religious preference—without
being “established” by the state.80 Outside of the context of schools and
taxes, the establishment clause in Alaska clearly does not mean that the
state government cannot consider religion in its legislative and judicial
duties.81 To the contrary, so long as the court does not pass judgment on
the value of a particular religion, it can—and even should—consider the
role of religion in individuals’ lives, both to their benefit and detriment.82
This distinction relaxes the state’s view on religion, allowing
constitutional thinking, individual liberties, and policy-making to
intermingle, stepping back from the absolute terms of Alaska’s earlier
establishment clause philosophy.83
Second, in Sheldon Jackson College v. State,84 the Alaska Supreme
Court held that tuition grants to private educational institutions must be
neutrally granted, secular in purpose, of reasonable magnitude, and not
a guise for channeling direct aid to those institutions.85 Notably, the court
relied on the minutes from the Alaska Constitutional Convention of 1956
to indicate the purpose of the direct benefits provision.86 According to the
court, at the Convention, the provision was included in part to ensure
“separation of church and state” without “executive or judicial inquiry
into the sectarian affiliation of particular schools,” thus allowing for
79. See id. (warning that an interpretation of the statute allowing a judge to
pass judgment on “which . . . religious beliefs are . . . more favorable to the
welfare of the child” would take the courts “too far down the path of religious
philosophy”).
80. See id. at 1240–44 (acknowledging that where a child expressed religious
preferences, a court may take those into consideration in custody disputes).
81. See id. (recognizing that a judge may consider religious preference in
certain circumstances).
82. See id. (same).
83. See generally id. (leaving room for the consideration of religion in a custody
case within delineated boundaries).
84. 599 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1979).
85. Id. at 130–31.
86. Id. at 129 (citing ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1 (“No money shall be paid
from public funds for the direct benefit of any religious or other private
educational institution.”)).
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greater objectivity.87 Meanwhile, the purposeful exclusion of an indirect
benefits prohibition reflected the state’s commitment to “providing for
the health and welfare” of students both inside and outside of the public
school system.88
The question for the court, given this apparent distinction between
types of benefits, was then to determine which benefits crossed the line
into direct aid for private schools and therefore represented potential
violations of the direct benefits clause and the establishment clause.89 The
court announced a four-part test to evaluate the directness of a
government benefit.90 According to the court, to be constitutional, a
benefit to a private school must be (1) neutrally provided without
reference to the school’s status and (2) support “essentially secular
educational functions.”91 The court must also consider (3) the “magnitude
of the benefit” and (4) whether direct aid might be disguised by
channeling the benefits through an intermediary.92
In laying out this test, the court cited a variety of sources, all from
outside the state of Alaska. From the U.S. Constitution93 to the Missouri
Constitution,94 and from U.S. Supreme Court cases95 to a constitutional
law treatise,96 the court pulled from a wide array of sources, searching for
authorities to transform the seemingly “metaphysical” distinction
between direct and indirect benefits into a precise one.97 While this
mishmash of authorities combines to create a fairly clean-cut and easily
applicable test, it fails to incorporate the uniqueness of the Alaska
Constitution in its discussion.98 Sheldon Jackson College may be the
appropriate test for article VII, section 1 challenges in Alaska, but it falls
short of fully addressing the principles behind the constitutional
structure, the policy considerations underlying the reinforced
establishment clause, or the potential for different interpretations of the

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 129–30.
90. Id. at 130.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 130–31.
93. Id. at 129 n.13 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I).
94. Id. at 129 n.12 (citing MO. CONST. art. IX, § 8).
95. Id. at 129 n.14 (citing first Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250, 254 (1977);
then Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 364–65 (1975); and then Comm. for Pub.
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 n.39 (1973)).
96. Id. at 130 n.15 (citing LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 840
(1978)).
97. Id. at 129–30.
98. See id. at 129 (noting that “the Alaska Constitution is apparently unique
in its express ban only on ‘direct’ benefits,” but failing to account for that
uniqueness in shaping its test).
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clauses, especially as read together. Sheldon Jackson College is, in other
words, merely a starting point: it is limited to school funding, makes no
reference to religious practices like legislative prayer, and still involves
judicial discretion in evaluating the place of religion in Alaskan
communities.
A few other notable cases implicate the overlap of religion and law
in Alaska. For example, in Frank v. State,99 the Alaska Supreme Court
addressed the impact of hunting regulations on the religious killing of a
moose. The court concluded that the law interfered with the Alaska
Native Athabascan people’s free exercise of religion.100 But for the
purposes of this discussion, the court’s most relevant statement was that
providing accommodations in generally applicable laws for religious
practices did not violate the establishment clause.101 Instead, such
accommodation “reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation
of neutrality” towards religion—no religion can be treated preferentially,
but religion should also not be overly burdened by state law.102 Frank
therefore clarifies that Alaska’s establishment obligations do not require
indifference to religion, but rather allow the government to carve out
exceptions where necessary to protect the free exercise of religion,
without violating the establishment clause.
However, more recently, in Lineker v. State,103 the Alaska Court of
Appeals indicated that to qualify for such an accommodation, individuals
must demonstrate a sincerely-held belief.104 The courts, therefore, in
balancing impediments to free exercise against worries about favoring
religion, cannot—and do not—turn a blind eye to individual religious
practice105 or the benefits that religious charity can provide.106 In other
words, such balancing requires at least some judicial consideration of
religion on a case-by-case basis.
Importantly, although Bonjour claims to align Alaska’s interpretation
with the federal Lemon test,107 the incorporation of authorities from other
99. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
100. Id. at 1073.
101. Id. at 1074–75
102. Id.
103. Nos. A-8957, A-8967, 2010 WL 200014 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2010). This
is an unpublished opinion, offering a useful analogy but not creating binding
precedent.
104. See id. at *3 (Bolger, J. concurring) (“[A] personal philosophy is not
equivalent to a religion.”).
105. Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1242 (Alaska 1979).
106. Sheldon Jackson College v. State, 599 P.2d 127, 130–31 (Alaska 1979).
107. Bonjour, 592 P.2d at 1242 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13
(1971) (holding that a statute “must have a secular legislative purpose,” have a
“principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” and may
not “foster an excessive government entanglement with religion”).
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states in Sheldon Jackson College to generate a new, four-factor analysis108
and the additional provisions of the Alaska Constitution combine to
create a unique recipe for state establishment analysis. Thus, by the end
of 1979, Alaska had developed a perspective on the establishment clause
that was deeply contextual, in contrast to the more formulaic federal
approach.109 First, the establishment clause could not be read
independently of the free exercise concerns reflected in article I, section 4
of the Alaska Constitution.110 Next, external limits in the state
constitution, like the direct benefits clause, further constrained the
government’s ability to support religious endeavors.111 And lastly,
cultural concerns unique to Alaska’s religious diversity demanded that
the courts be sensitive to the needs of both individuals and whole
communities.112
These articles and cases shed light on key background for Hunt v.
Kenai Peninsula Borough. Despite the Superior Court’s declaration that the
Alaska establishment clause holdings follow their federal counterparts,113
the Alaska cases demonstrate that the state actually has a unique and
complicated jurisprudence surrounding the application of its religion
clauses to state statutes and controversies.114 The Hunt court therefore
oversimplifies the establishment question by narrowing the debate to
legislative prayer and hewing exclusively to federal precedent.115 State
precedents, by contrast, offer a complex picture of extreme judicial
caution towards monetary benefits, alongside recognition of longstanding tradition and respect for the potential good religion can do as a
public service.116 Hunt fails to fully investigate these concerns in the

108. Sheldon Jackson College, 599 P.2d at 130–31.
109. See Bonjour, 592 P.2d at 1242 (discussing the relevant factual findings a
court can consider in analyzing religious in child custody cases); Sheldon Jackson
College, 599 P.2d at 130 (identifying the relevant facts to consider in an
establishment clause challenge).
110. See Bonjour, 592 P.2d at 1242 (noting that examination of a child’s actual
religious needs can further the best interests of the child).
111. See Sheldon Jackson College, 599 P.2d at 130 (analyzing whether public
finding for private schools violates the state constitution).
112. See generally Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979) (discussing the
need to consider religious traditions in carving out exceptions to hunting
regulations).
113. Hunt v. Kenai Borough Peninsula, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI, at 3 (Alaska
Super.
Ct.
Oct.
9,
2018)
(on
file
with
Alaska
ACLU),
https://www.acluak.org/sites/default/files/3an-16-10652ci.pdf.
114. Hunt reads Bonjour as purely aligning the state establishment clause with
the federal one, id., but as the rest of the courts’ decisions confirm, Alaska’s
position on religious freedom is much more complicated than simply following
federal developments.
115. See id. at 2, 8–14 (citing federal legislative prayer cases).
116. See Green, supra note 14, at 249–51 (discussing the evolution of state court
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legislative prayer context.
Therefore, the current debate, ignited by colander-sporting Barrett
Fletcher, leaves open questions for Alaska’s religious-liberties trajectory.
Is it appropriate for local governments to incorporate religion into their
daily practice in any capacity? If so, when does traditional
accommodation slip into endorsement? How significant must a public
purpose be to overcome the anti-establishment bent of the Alaska
Constitution? And, perhaps most importantly, what is the best policy for
dealing with religious concerns, given the competing incentives
underlying over half a century of state decisions?

IV. ANALYZING ALASKA’S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE THROUGH
EARLY CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES
To answer these questions and point Alaska in the right direction
toward both protecting religious freedom and recognizing the
importance of religion in Alaskan society, this Comment suggests that
legislators, town councils, and attorneys look to the early constitutional
debates in other states to craft Alaska’s solution. Three distinct categories
of debate merit discussion. First, Alaska finds itself embroiled in conflicts
most often when religious actions serve municipal purposes—a tension
the Framers also recognized.117 Second, religious traditions run deep in
Alaska, both in the cultural and political landscape, a position parallel to
nineteenth century Massachusetts.118 Lastly, the debate stirred up by the
Pastafarians raises the specter of religious entanglement and oppression,
a core issue concerning early Virginians.119
Decades after the last Alaska Supreme Court establishment clause
case, Alaska’s establishment clause debate reopened over legislative
prayer policies, representing the overlap of municipal and religious
purposes.120 Even the trial court in Hunt noted that the tradition of
legislative prayer could serve to unite and refocus a community at the
jurisprudence on the “direct benefits” and “public purpose” clauses); see also
Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1242 (Alaska 1979) (recognizing that religion
can be beneficial to a child).
117. See, e.g., Natanson, supra note 3 (highlighting the role of religious
invocation in a local governing body).
118. See, e.g., Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979) (discussing how state
hunting regulations restricted the cultural and religious traditions of the Alaskan
Athabascans).
119. Compare Natanson, supra note 3 (discussing the challenges to the role of
religion in local government), with James Madison, DETACHED MEMORANDA 144
(1817) (compiled for Jeff Powell, Constitutional Law II, LAW 518) (discussing the
threat of casual interweaving of religion and government).
120. See Natanson, supra note 3 (detailing the debate over legislative prayer
practices).
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beginning of a government meeting.121 As such, legislative prayer serves
a kind of public purpose; more than simply offering a pulpit for
proselytizing, legislative prayer involves community members in the
business of government and exposes the attendees to the convictions of
their neighbors.122 Importantly, legislative prayer is often considered an
insignificant intrusion of religion on government, at least compared to
historic practices.123 The prayer involves no state expenditure, requires
nothing from the audience, and represents only a short overlap of religion
and government. In Massachusetts, by contrast, the first state constitution
provided that the state legislature and town governments could go so far
as to provide for public religious (usually Protestant) teachers via local
taxes.124 The Massachusetts courts then took on a litany of cases, balancing
the recognized public good of religion against the potential for
discrimination or impediments to free exercise.125
The Massachusetts cases show that, whether in a public meeting
house or a legislative prayer, in small communities, religion and local
government must functionally coexist.126 Importantly, religion can be a
powerful unifying force, especially in local government.127 It fosters
community, collective action, and camaraderie when people understand

121. Hunt v. Kenai Borough Peninsula, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI, at 3 (Alaska
Super.
Ct.
Oct.
9,
2018)
(on
file
with
Alaska
ACLU),
https://www.acluak.org/sites/default/files/3an-16-10652ci.pdf.
122. See also Truslow & Jones, supra note 21, at 129 (quoting Hunt, No. 3AN16-10652 CI, at 17) (“The Hunt court accurately tracked the language and spirit of
Greece by citing the purpose of legislative prayer to be one of uniting people of
many faiths in ‘a community of tolerance and devotion.’”).
123. See id. at 124–25 (discussing legislative prayer’s long tradition in many
states and in Congress as evidence of its minimal impact on establishment clause
concerns).
124. Abrams v. Howe, 14 Mass. 340, 346 (1817) (citing MASS. CONST. art. III).
125. Most of the early Massachusetts cases fell into two categories: cases about
tax exemptions for religious dissenters and cases about government use of churchowned land. See, e.g., Barnes v. Inhabitants of First Parish in Falmouth, 6 Mass.
401, 404–05 (Mass. 1810). But see First Parish in Medford v. Inhabitants of Medford,
38 Mass. 199 (Mass. 1838). Both categories, however, teach the same basic lesson:
while Massachusetts could not force participation in a particular religion, it could
certainly choose which ones to support and how to do so. Perhaps this tolerance
for state influence was a product of the times (these cases date from 1810 through
1838), but that does not undermine its value in showing the potential breadth of
the establishment clause. See, e.g., Barnes, 6 Mass. at 404–05 (upholding a state tax
where proceeds went to religious ministers).
126. See, e.g., Inhabitants of First Parish in Medford v. Pratt, 21 Mass. 222, 234–
35 (1826) (“In most of our towns, from time immemorial, meetinghouses have
been built as well for the accommodation of the inhabitants at town meetings, as
for public worship.”).
127. See Barnes, 6 Mass. at 404, 405–06 (discussing the role of religion in “the
security and happiness of the citizens” of a free civil government).
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their fellow citizens’ motivations.128 By allowing religion to play a
continuing role in town meetings, Alaskan communities like the Kenai
Peninsula Borough might not only more efficiently achieve municipal
purposes, pooling the resources of various backgrounds and cultures, but
also foster greater understanding and tolerance. If at every town meeting
the council invites a religious invocation, for all of its divine, cultural, and
communicative purposes, community members might come together
both to solve problems and to learn from one another. Such is, at least in
part, the model of early Massachusetts.
There is, however, a cautionary tale to be told as well. In Virginia,
both the state constitution and the cases that followed reveal a deepseated antagonism towards any intermingling of church and state.129
Virginia approached religion as a private matter—between a man and his
God, as well as between a church and its property. Virginia law converted
church lands into private deeds, rather than state-sponsored benefits to
the churches, cleaving the Anglican church from the newly independent
state government.130
As the Virginian worries highlight, the risk of a rosy-glassed view of
religion and government is that favoritism, or even mere majority, may
lead one religious view to trounce all others.131 In allowing even as
innocuous a tradition as legislative prayer, Alaska might inadvertently
place its thumb on the scale of mainstream religions, and the slippery
slope from that point lands the state and local governments with de facto
establishment of one sect, group, or family of religions. To follow the
Virginia example, then, Alaska might dispense with tradition, favoring
safety instead, and close the city hall doors firmly on religion.
But despite Alaska’s strongly worded constitution, the state remains
steeped in religious tradition. The constitutional convention, held nearly

128. See id. (discussing the limitations of the state alone in “oblig[ing] the
performance” of moral duties).
129. See, e.g., Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call.) 113 (1804). Virginia sets an
example for strong separation and a reading of the establishment clause that
leaves little room for blurring the edges of religion’s designated box. See, e.g., Act
for Establishing Religious Freedom (1785) (as compiled for Jeff Powell,
Constitutional Law II, LAW 518).
130. See, e.g., Turpin, 10 Va. (6 Call.) at 128 (discussing the inheritability of glebe
lands between the established church and private individuals).
131. See Madison, supra note 119 (discussing the dangers of allowing churches
to accumulate property, of designating a chaplain in Congress, and of allowing
chaplains in the army and navy as evidence of the encroachment of religion on
government and Madison’s fears that these institutions would either give undue
power to religion generally or establish a preferred religion).
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200 years after its Massachusettsan132 and Virginian counterparts,133
opened with a legislative prayer.134 That tradition, carried on today by at
least the Kenai Peninsula Borough, demonstrates two key things. First,
governmental recognition of the role of religion is baked into the daily
functions of Alaskan government, even if it is formally separated by the
constitution and the law.135 Second, the tradition must serve some
purpose because for over fifty years public servants have continued the
practice despite loud and varied objections.136 Like Massachusetts,
therefore, Alaska cannot divorce itself wholly from religion. Nor should
it, if it wants to follow the Massachusetts example. Like the early
nineteenth century towns striving to serve both religious and civil
purposes, the Alaska Constitution embraces the tension between denying
the establishment of religion and recognizing that religious people and
religious institutions serve great public purposes. Looking to both
Massachusetts and Virginia as examples, the fatal mistake would be for
Alaska to ignore the role of religion in everyday life.
Lastly, the impassioned Alaskan dissenters, the Pastafarians, bring
to the state the ghosts of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. More than
a political debate framed in local disputes and state governance, the
Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster’s sarcastic demonstration evokes
again the framers’ concerns that any intermingling of religion and
government represents an affront to both values. Both Madison and
Jefferson expressed concerns that pure adherence to democracy or
tradition would lead their state down a path of tyranny.137 While perhaps
132. The first Massachusetts constitutional convention took place between
1779–1780. John Adams & the Massachusetts Constitution, MASS.GOV,
https://www.mass.gov/guides/john-adams-the-massachusettsconstitution#:~:text=became%20more%20urgent.,Massachusetts%20Invents%20the%20Constitutional%20Convention,to%20the%
20voters%20for%20approval (last visited Mar. 29, 2022).
133. The first Virginia constitutional convention took place in 1774. 1776
Constitution of Virginia, VA. PLACES,
http://www.virginiaplaces.org/government/constitution1776.html (last visited
Mar. 29, 2022).
134. Truslow & Jones, supra note 21, at 122–23.
135. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 4 (“No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”).
136. See Natanson, supra note 3 (highlighting the practice of legislative prayer
in local government).
137. See Madison, supra note 119 (discussing the pitfalls of creating
corporations to avoid state churches, despite democratic incentives to preserve
the churches); Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (1785) at 122 (as compiled
for Jeff Powell, Constitutional Law II, LAW 518) (“Whereas . . . the impious
presumption of legislators and rulers . . . have assumed dominion over the faith
of others, setting up their own opinions and modes of thinking as the only true
and infallible . . . be it enacted . . . that no man shall be compelled to frequent or
support any religious worship.”).
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he did not put it in quite so clear terms, Barrett Fletcher’s worry is the
same: his offense at involving religion in government seems rooted in a
fear that the end of the partnership between religion and government will
be the blindness to new ideas or the silence of dissenters.138 The
Madison/Jefferson line adds a two-sided context to the current debate:
not only may government be negatively influenced by religion, but
religion might be eroded by government.139 According to the framers,
then, the Pastafarians’ tongue-in-cheek protests are missing half the
argument. To fully understand the policy of a strong establishment
clause, states should consider the religion-government relationship to be
a two-way street.140
All told, the early constitutional debates clarify that, at a minimum,
ignoring religion is not an option for either Alaska or its local
governments. Whether viewing religion as a positive to be protected and
promoted like Massachusetts, or a creature of private conscience to be
assessed with suspicion in the halls of government like Virginia, no part
of the peer-states’ early histories suggest that separation should mean
blindness.141 In other words, government can neither passively accept
religious truths as the guideposts for moral duties nor dismiss religion’s
definitive impact as the concern of private debate alone.142 The mere fact
that this many cases, this many words, and this many remarkable thinkers
have been dedicated to assessing the proper relationship between religion
and government should assure today’s authorities that their time is not
wasted when dedicated to the problem of establishment.

V. CONCLUSION: FOR NOW, AT LEAST, THE PASTAFARIANS ARE
RIGHT
The establishment threat facing Alaska today appears to be a
138. See Natanson, supra note 3 (highlighting Fletcher’s concern about religion
playing any role in government).
139. See Madison, supra note 119, at 145 (warning that, without a strong sense
of religious liberty, Americans risked “giving to Caesar what belongs to God”).
140. See id. (discussing both the ways in which religion could improperly
influence government and those in which government could stain religion).
141. Compare, e.g., Barnes v. Inhabitants of First Parish in Falmouth, 6 Mass.
401, 405 (1810) (discussing the benefits of religion with respect to the “moral
duties” of citizens), with Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call.) 113 (1804) (discussing
the effect of the American revolution on the legal status of a church).
142. Compare, e.g., Holbrook v. Holbrook, 18 Mass. 248, 260 (1822) (“To compel
a man to attend public worship where he is dissatisfied with the minister or
teacher is not likely to be profitable either for instruction or moral
improvement.”), with Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. 43 (1815) (finding that the
constitutionally-required free exercise of religion did not permit the state to divest
churches of their rightful property).
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movement toward the over-inclusion of religion in government.
Therefore, for now, the Pastafarians are right. If the Kenai Peninsula
Borough’s invocation policy is any representation of overall trends in the
state, the government has clearly recognized the potential good religion
can do for the public. However, the local government has also shown its
propensity to exclude small or controversial religions.143 Preventing that
instinct from growing any further appears to be the very purpose of
Alaska’s establishment clause.
Therefore, Alaska should look to Virginia, Madison, and Jefferson to
avoid allowing religion to overstep its bounds and seep into government.
The Virginian example would not require Alaska to ignore religion or
devalue it, but rather would prevent the biases of leaders from
disadvantaging Alaskan citizens. In fact, by restricting legislative room
for religious preference, Alaska might better protect the religious and
cultural diversity that it boasts. By disallowing religiously-based
regulations and qualifications, Alaska might foster greater discussion and
debate among citizens, and ensure that the religious persuasions of
leaders do not stamp out the value of the minority.
However, Alaska should be careful not to follow Fletcher and the
Pastafarians too far down the trail towards total separation of church and
state. Even the early constitutional cases from Virginia still demand a
respect for religion and a recognition of its societal significance.144 If
Alaska goes too far towards devaluing religion, it risks losing some of its
cultural heritage and diversity. Even the tradition of legislative prayer,
properly practiced, can expose citizens and communities to new ideas and
cultures otherwise pushed to the outskirts. Therefore, while the
Pastafarians are right to point out the dangers of the current impulses in
Alaskan local government, their suggestion of total, unequivocal
separation has costs of its own.

143. See Hunt v. Kenai Borough Peninsula, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI, at 3 (Alaska
Super.
Ct.
Oct.
9,
2018)
(on
file
with
Alaska
ACLU),
https://www.acluak.org/sites/default/files/3an-16-10652ci.pdf
(discussing
how the Borough’s invocation policy excluded minority faiths).
144. See supra Part IV.

